INTEGRATED RESPONSE OF THE COMMUNITY TO HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NOVI PAZAR

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INTEGRATED RESPONSE OF THE COMMUNITY TO HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NOVI PAZAR

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## VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

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INTRODUCTION

Human security is a concept that strives towards stability and prosperity of citizens and communities and as such represents a great opportunity and potential for sustainable development. In the context of Novi Pazar and the development challenges that we all face in our daily efforts to improve local conditions on all levels – the understanding of human security, the numerous dimensions of achieving “freedom from fear and deprivation”, and the way they affect us, becomes crucial. This concept implies stability and predictability, which allows individuals to focus resources, time and energy on developing and improving their own lives and the community as a whole.

It is clear that human security refers not only to state safety but indicates a wide range of insecurities to which individuals, especially vulnerable groups, are exposed in today’s society. Violence in various forms, poverty, social exclusion, discrimination, vulnerability due to demolition of a healthy environment are just some examples of insecurities faced by individuals and even whole groups.

Bearing in mind the fact that Novi Pazar is a city with a great population of young people and the risks stemming from the disturbed perception of human security and safety – we must not allow insecurity and unsafety, including radicalism and extremism, become our daily norm. Adequate and timely responses to potential risks
and threats have to assume the necessity of animating all subjects in the local community and integrating available resources.

With this in mind, Cultural Center DamaD with the generous support of the Embassy of Switzerland in Serbia conducted a research of two elements which directly affect and relate to human security at the local level in Novi Pazar, in an effort to better understand this phenomenon and provide institutional and wider social answers: Research on risk factors that affect human security in Novi Pazar; Mapping and assessment of the capacity of public institutions to provide support to human security. With that we are starting a comprehensive process of raising the resistance of the local community and young people to security threats and the encouragement of an integrated social response to security risks, including radicalism and extremisms.

Samid Šarenkapić
Extremism and radicalism among youth in Novi Pazar
– perceptions, risks and threats

This document presents the main findings of the qualitative research on the vulnerabilities of youth in Novi Pazar with regard to extremism and radicalism.
Introduction

Sandžak is one of the most underdeveloped regions in Serbia, faced with numerous human security threats which create an insecure environment for the everyday lives of its citizens. Additionally, Sandžak is one of the most culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse areas in the country, thus creating additional challenges and tensions. Although the region is still relatively stable, numerous insecurities suggest the need for coordinated measures in order to prevent possible downside risks of the insecurity people are faced with. Some excesses of violence and increasing social isolation can be already seen as important indicators of possible threats, and considerable steps need to be made now in order to curb the escalation of these trends.

Bearing this in mind, the research focuses on making some first steps towards increasing our understanding of extremism and radicalism in Novi Pazar. It is important to note that extremism and radicalism are not predefined categories, here they are understood in the context of human security and in relation to the bottom-up approach to the community as well as to the individual perspectives on the subject. Herewith we are looking at how extremism and radicalism are understood by the people living in Novi Pazar, what makes them insecure and what threatens their everyday life. The focus has been put on youth, as youth is one of the most vulnerable
groups to extremism and radicalism, while at the same being the most amenable to possible preventive measures.

The research was initiated by DamaD, an NGO located in Novi Pazar, and carried out by SeConS – Development Initiative Group in the months February – March 2015. DamaD recognized the need for developing a more in-depth understanding of these phenomena in Sandžak as well as to make the first steps towards developing and strengthening the institutional capacities and developing integrated responses to security challenges, including extremism and radicalism in the region. Hence, the overall objective of this research was to explore the perceptions of the community and the youth regarding extremism and radicalism in Novi Pazar.

This document will first present the approach taken to understand extremism and radicalism in the city. The second part will focus on the empirical findings presenting perceptions of insecurity, extremism and radicalism, followed by possible modalities and examples of increased tensions. The final part of the report will give some conclusions on these findings and recommendations for the steps to be taken.
Cultural Centre DamaD is a nongovernmental, nonpartisan and nonprofit organization whose mission is to build democratic identity of multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural local communities and the country as a whole, to promote the culture of peace and tolerance, to encourage dialogue and cooperation, to enhance, protect and promote human and minority rights, especially the right to a life without violence, to empower women and promote gender equality as a precondition for sustainable development, to educate citizens for civil society, to build lasting changes in attitudes and perceptions of people, to empower citizens to actively participate in decision making, to publicly advocate for changes that lead to a more open, democratic and civil society.

In this sense, our work is focused on four strategic priorities:
1. Government transparency and accountability
2. Democratization and civic participation
3. Equal opportunities, nondiscrimination and gender equality
4. Culture of dialogue and cooperation

SeConS is an independent think-thank organization with experts who conduct empirical research, analyze policies and processes, specific social and economic challenges, educate, train and empower different actors. Data collection and analysis conducted by SeConS are a reliable basis for development of methodologies, recommendations and policies. This is an important contribution to the development and implementation of national, regional and local policies.

This document was supported by the Swiss Embassy in Belgrade. Contents of the document are the sole responsibility of the author and publisher, and can under no circumstances be regarded as necessarily reflecting the views of the donor.
Human Security, Extremism and Radicalism

Since both extremism and radicalism are considered highly sensitive issues, both in the political and academic arena, the researchers have approached the subject through a security perspective, with an emphasis on human security. This approach has two key agendas. Firstly, it will help us avoid preconceived notions and presumptions among local stakeholders. Secondly, it will conceptually allow us to define extremism and radicalism through a more bottom-up perspective, rather than try to fill the preconceived categories.

Defining Human Security

Human security is a relatively new paradigm for approaching the problem of security. Contrary to the traditional concepts of security, which revolve around the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, human security recognizes that the security of individuals is essential in building stable and peaceful societies. The definition of the Commission on Human Security is as followed:

Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental,
economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.¹

This individual security is multifaceted and depends upon the interrelatedness of multiple different phenomena. The main objective of human security initiatives is thereby to protect individuals and groups from a range of severe and pervasive harms which affect their ability to lead tolerable lives. Hence, human security focuses on addressing and preventing risks to individuals’ and groups’ physical, material and psychological being, summarized as ensuring freedom from fear, freedom from want and dignity.

Human security is a child who did not die, a disease that has not spread, a job that is not extinguished, an ethnic tension that did not erupt in violence, a dissident who was not convicted. Human security is not concerned with weapons, it deals with human life and dignity.²

Although the concept has long been in the process of developing (e.g. John Burton’s emphasis on the individual in international security), it was first introduced in the international arena in UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report. In this report, 7 key areas or dimensions of security have been identified: economic, political, health, food, environmental, personal, community and political security. It is important to keep in mind that these dimensions are interconnected and often reinforce and influence one another. Since the publication of the UNDP report, more scholars and policy makers have taken an interest into the approach. In accordance with these dimensions, some scholars have also tried to develop indicators and indexes which can help assess human security threats.

Another approach to human security which differs from this more rigid structure is the bottom-up approach, often promoted by scholars from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). In this qualitative approach to human security, human security emphasizes the lived experiences of insecurity and the interconnection of threats. The focus here is thus to understand the relation between the severity of a threat and an individual’s capacity to ameliorate it, rather than representing an “objective”, measurable phenomenon. Hence, the emphasis is on the way how vulnerability is articulated by those affected. ³

In both approaches, the main features of human security are:

• people-centredness,
• multisectoral approach,
• comprehensiveness,
• context-specificness (geographically, historically and culturally),
• and prevention-orientation. ⁴

In this research, we have put more focus on the subjective approach to human security as an avenue into discussing extremism and radicalism. This approach has been recognized as a good starting point for understanding individuals’ feelings of threat and identifying possible risk factors which can contribute to an unstable and insecure environment where extremism and radicalism can take root.


Defining Extremism and Radicalism

In general, extremism refers to activities – beliefs, attitudes, feelings, strategies – which are out of the ordinary. Simply defined, extremism refers to beliefs and ideas that are not considered correct by the majority of people. These activities are most often closely connected to an ideology, which is either political or religious, and outside of the mainstream. These ideologies are thereby in opposition to common and widespread morals, norms and values of a given society or setting.

Extremism can be used to refer to political ideologies that oppose a society’s core values and principles. In the context of liberal democracies this could be applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and universal human rights. The term can also be used to describe the methods through which political actors attempt to realize their aims, that is, by using means that show disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others.5

With this in mind, extremism becomes a very complex phenomenon, as it can vary greatly as to what it refers to and what is defined as ordinary. In effect, it is an inherently subjective and political matter whereby framing is essential to understanding what and why something is defined as extremist. Therefore, some key notions need to be addressed when examining the phenomenon, as presented by Dr. Peter T. Coleman and Dr. Andrea Bartoli in the report “Addressing Extremism”:

• what is defined as an extremist act depends on the observer’s values, politics, moral scope, and the nature of their relationship with the actor;
• the current and historical context of extremist acts shapes our view of what and who is defining the moral or immoral nature of a given act of extremism, and may therefore change as conditions change;
• power differences matter when defining extremism;
• extremist acts often employ violent means, although extremist groups will differ in their preference for violent vs. nonviolent tactics, in the level of violence they employ, and in the preferred targets of their violence;
• extremist individuals and groups may be conflicted or ambivalent psychologically as individuals, and/or contain a great deal of differences, and should not be viewed as homogeneous groups;
• the core problem that extremism presents in situations of protracted conflict is less the severity of the activities but more so the closed, fixed, and intolerant nature of extremist attitudes, and their subsequent imperviousness to change.

As in the case of extremism, radicalism and radicalization are also very sensitive topics. They refer to the process by which illegal or violent means are used as a tool in the political process:

The process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes (radicalism)⁶

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As in the case of extremism, radicalism usually has a political component which suggests the aim for a large-scale social or political change. Here however, the issues of violence and illegal means for realizing goals become more central. Traditionally, political radicalism has referred to either left or right wing political streams with revolutionary political agendas, while religious radicalism has been linked to fundamentalism and strict adherence to theological doctrines. Hence, the above definitions can be linked to numerous different groups with different ideologies, agendas, structures etc.

What becomes evident when exploring the phenomenon of extremism and radicalism is that it can mean different things to different people and, depending on the political and social context, extremist or radical acts can be seen both as threats to security or as possible ways for gaining more security. In this paper, we will assume that radicalism and extremism are considered as possible harms when they encourage violent behavior. Connecting extremism and radicalism to violent acts and violence as such has concrete implications. They can be harmful to both individual and society as a whole, as well as to important institutions and organizations.
Methodology

Research on perception related to extremism and radicalism has been conducted through qualitative research methods. This methodological approach has been selected in order to gain in-depth accounts on these issues, which can help tailor recommendations and further actions aimed at preventing extremism and radicalism in Novi Pazar.

The research project was conducted in 5 stages:

- **Preparatory Phase:** Desk research, preparation of research instruments, discussions on methodology etc.
- **Fieldwork Phase:** Focus groups discussions, in-depth interviews
- **Analysis Phase:** Analyzing and coding data, preparation of draft research outputs
- **Validation Phase:** Discussion on draft research outputs.
- **Finalization Phase:** Finalizing all outputs

The desk research focused on analysis of existing literature in this field in Serbia and Novi Pazar in particular, analysis of current policy documents and frameworks, as well as collection of some key data for Novi Pazar. This desk research was not only important for contextualizing the research in Novi Pazar, but also for developing research instruments and target groups for further inquiry during fieldwork.
The main objective of the fieldwork conducted in Novi Pazar was to get the opinions on insecurity, extremism and radicalism from both institutional and community representatives, and from youth in particular. Bearing this in mind, focus group discussions with community representatives included representatives of the local self-government, the judiciary, Islamic Community, elementary and secondary education, State University in Novi Pazar, Center for Social Welfare, Sports Club, and Civil Society Organizations. A focus group discussion (FGD) is a good way to gather together people with similar backgrounds while allowing the participants to discuss (agree or disagree) different issues with each other. In turn, this provides a valuable insight into the way how a group thinks about an issue, about the range of opinions and ideas, and the inconsistencies and variation which exists in a particular community in terms of beliefs and their experiences and practices. In addition to the focus group discussion, individual interviews were also conducted with representatives of some institutions – Local Security Council, NGOs and the Student Council. In-depth interviews could in turn give us some more personalized accounts of institutional capacities and challenges. The second set of interviews was conducted with youth representatives. In total, 7 in-depth interviews were conducted with this group in order to gain firsthand accounts of their personal experience of insecurity, extremism and radicalism within their community, different ways of internalizing extremist attitudes, and their perspective on risks related to these subjects.

In addition to the fieldwork conducted within this project period, important previous research inputs were also used in the analysis. Namely, data from focus group discussions organized in Novi Pazar on the topic of human security as part of the UN project “Improving Human Security for Vulnerable Communities in South-
west Serbia” and focus groups conducted on human security and youth violence as a part of the EU funded project “Cross-border citizens” network for peace, inter-communal reconciliation and human security”.7

7 These FGDs were organized in the period from May 2013 – May 2014
Municipality of Novi Pazar

Basic Info

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>100,410</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>742 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Raška</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population</td>
<td>68.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>135.32 inhabitants per square km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sociodemographic characteristics

According to the Census from 2011, the Municipality of Novi Pazar has 100,410 registered inhabitants. The population is made up of 48.8% men and 50.2% women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>49,984</td>
<td>48.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50,426</td>
<td>50.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,410</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In relation to ethnic identity, 77.1% of inhabitants identify themselves as Bosniaks, making it the largest ethnic group in the region. This is followed by Serbs (16.2%) Muslims (4%), and other (2.7%).

Novi Pazar is also the youngest municipality in Serbia. The young population, up to 19 years of age, makes up 32% of the local population. The average age of the population is 33 years old, which is far below of the average level for Serbia. This is also confirmed by positive natural increase rate of + 8.6% according to the Census of 2011.

The two main religious communities in Novi Pazar are the Christian Orthodox Church (16%) and the Islam (82%). Since 2007, the Republic of Serbia has parallel Islamic Community administrations:

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– the Islamic Community in Serbia, based in Novi Pazar and headed by Mevlud Dudić, with the spiritual center in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

– the Islamic Community of Serbia, based in Belgrade and headed by Adem Zilkić.

**Economic Situation**

The Municipality of Novi Pazar is classified as third level development municipality according to the level of development of municipalities. This means that development is ranging from 60% to 80% of the national development average.\(^{11}\)

In relation to employment, the municipality is in a relatively unfavorable position. In the year 2013 the employment rate amounted to 15.9%, which is a decrease compared to the 19.5% in the year 2011.\(^{12}\) This unfavorable economic situation is also reflected in the employment numbers. According to the Census from 2011, 11,448 people are unemployed, suggesting an unemployment rate of 36.87% on the territory of Novi Pazar.\(^{13}\) Unofficial data suggest that this percentage is even higher, while the unemployment rate among youth is around 70%.

Most employees work in the education sector (1,972 persons), followed by the sector of process manufacturing (1,687 persons), wholesale and retail trade (1,558 persons) and health and social care (1,510 persons).\(^{14}\)

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13 Statistical office of the Republic of Serbia, 2014, Municipalities and Regions in Serbia
Political Structure

Novi Pazar is governed by a city assembly composed of 47 assembly members, a mayor and a vice-mayor. After the last election held in 2012, the local assembly is composed of the parties presented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/coalition</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Novi Pazar - Rasim Ljajić (SDP, SDPS, DS)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Together - Emir Elfić</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandžak (BDZS)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent members</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United regions of Serbia - Dr Mirsad Derlek</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let’s start up Novi Pazar - Tomislav Nikolić (SNS, NS, DSS)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Official site of the Municipality: www.novipazar.rs
Manifestations of extremism and radicalism

As mentioned in the operationalization of extremism and radicalism, these phenomena are context-bound and often dependent on the position of the analyzer. We do not want to give the examples of extremism and radicalism here, but rather pinpoint certain domains and problems which could be indicators of conflict and violence. These are based on the perceptions of the respondents involved in this research and recognition of some possible indicators of extremism and radicalism in their narratives.

Sandžak in Serbia

There are several instances where respondents have expressed the need for separation of the Sandžak region from Serbia. In some extreme cases this could be interpreted as the need for complete secession, although most respondents expressed just the need for autonomy. This attitude is closely related to the feeling of injustice when it comes to central powers, especially the feeling that the Sandžak region and ethnic Bosniaks are being socially excluded and marginalized in Serbia.

I think that this government in Belgrade is a gang. I’m not sympathizing, I find them completely antipathic… People here in general, almost everyone, think of Belgrade as an enemy. That’s the general attitude here. They see Belgrade as the enemy, someone who is squashing our rights.
Consequently, several respondents think the region and the prosperity of its people would be better represented through a more localized political and economic autonomy.

**Football and Violence**

The connection between football and some forms of extreme violence are widespread in Serbia, and Novi Pazar is no exception. The football team of Novi Pazar plays a key role in the region, attracting thousands of spectators at every football match. Still, football matches and conflicts linked to the football club affiliation are prominent in Novi Pazar.

According to the respondents, there could be numerous reasons for these conflicts. Sympathies for the club, minority/majority relations in Serbia and political affiliation have been mentioned as the main reasons behind altercations. In the most severe cases, these altercations grow into a violent conflict. This violence can be manifested as symbolic violence (insults on ethnic and religious basis) or as direct physical altercations. Several instances of fights, stabbings and, in the worst scenario, murders have been recorded on this basis.¹⁵

**Political, Religious and Ethnic Tensions**

As will be seen in the next section of this report, tensions between political, religious and ethnic groups are considered to be one of the main conflict instigators. Respondents are stressing numerous instances of symbolic, psychological and physical altercations between political parties and religious institutions in Novi Pazar.

¹⁵ Politika: http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Sport/fudbal/Novi-Pazar-priznalo-krivicu-za-pretnju-pistoljem-igracu.lt.html
Cultural Centre DamaD

Some of these are seen as direct provocations, which are very extreme in character. For instance, one protest march in recognition of Chetniks [Serb nationalists] was considered as a direct threat that could result in severe altercations. As one respondent recalls his reaction to the planned march:

A civil war can happen. Because the people here, look, no one from us Bosniaks has a positive opinion about Chetniks. We experienced crimes at the hand of Chetniks during the Second World War, and later during the 90s, when people who were presenting themselves as Chetniks were committing crimes. And now they are like “I, as a Chetnik commander, I’m going to collect all the Serbs and walk to the municipality”. What are you doing here?

Similarly, the organization of a uniformed parade The visit to Hadžet (Pohod na Hadžet) in order to pay tribute to Bosniaks killed by communists as collaborators of Nazis in the WW2, in September 2014, was experienced as an extreme form of provocation.16

Another example are also altercations witnessed during public meetings and election campaigns. As for instance one respondent remembers, physical altercations are not uncommon.

We know that here, often during elections, some type of excess happens, some type of instability… Taking out a gun or something like that. Here, we don’t have a political culture and there’s no political dialogue. There’s no political dialogue were we can talk about our personal opinions with respect.

16 Blic: http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/494354/Ljajic-Pohod-na-Hadzet-najveca-opasnost-u-Novom-Pazaru
B92: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2014&mm=09&dd=05&nav_id=896388
Demands Towards Women

Some respondents have stressed the connection between extremism and increased demands towards women in Novi Pazar. A growing pressure towards women in relation to their sexuality and community perception of their sexuality is mentioned. For instance, one respondent stressed how she is always home before 11pm because otherwise she would be perceived as immoral or perhaps one of those who doesn’t not have the “right” values.

Guys can always stay longer in the city. They can be secure, in quotes so to say (shows quotation with hands). They can be longer in the city, get into a fight, and all of that. But a girl who is in the city after 11, then the story starts. “This doesn’t make any sense, a girl in the city after 11 o’clock.” Blah blah blah… And then in that sense I feel insecure. People have prejudices if they see me in the city at 11.30.

Another respondent stressed the clothing, especially that what is considered as the “appropriate” way of dressing, as something which is becoming increasingly conservative among women in the Islamic community. Moreover, he stressed that Serb Orthodox women are also starting to “self-police” their behavior due to social pressures.

Conflict in Syria

The most extreme case identified is participation in the conflict in Syria under the Islamic State. Participation of young people from Novi Pazar is considered a growing trend, whereby several young people from the city have already fallen while fighting abroad.17

Several respondents stressed that groups, within which such behavior is supported, are often groups that have completely isolated themselves from the rest of the society. Most notably, it is stressed that they have completely separated themselves from the broader religious community, and are committed to very conservative views on religion which support jihadist fights. Alarmingly, one representative of the Islamic community noted that these groups are only growing, and that this problem will become increasingly threatening.

There are however different opinions about what instigates their formation and how they function. One respondent explained that religious individual who have been studying or living abroad (Syria or Saudi-Arabia) have brought some of these extremist views to Novi Pazar. Another respondent stressed how some people often take on these views for a couple of years, but quickly realize that they do not want to be separated from the broader society in this way, and that their rules are too restraining.

Most notably however, several respondents stressed that possible affiliation with these groups can be linked to an overall feeling of insecurity within Novi Pazar and with personal identification with the injustice witnessed in Syria, especially with the injustice they feel within their community and family.

To tell you the truth, I did think about it… Should I be going to Syria? That was the story… Assad has been in power for so long, he is a shia, he is killing sunni, he is a minority, but is oppressing the majority… They had a really good story! I could identify with that. You recognize yourself, and that is the reason that so many people are going…
Mainstreaming of Extremist Views

In the end, it is important to remark that there is an overall perception among the respondents that Novi Pazar is radicalizing. Also, extreme and radical attitudes and acts are becoming mainstream, while more tolerant and open-minded attitudes are becoming the marginalized attitudes, paradoxically becoming extreme views that go against the norm. For instance, the political and media attack on the theatrical production “Beton mahala”, which talked about problems in the society, is one example where values representing tolerance and dialogue were considered extreme.
Extremism and Radicalism – Risks and Threats

This section will present some of the main perceptions regarding possible risk factors and threats that can lead to extremism and radicalism among youth. As mentioned earlier, these are highly sensitive and complex issues. The aim here is not to stress causal relationships between these problems and possible negative outcomes, but rather to identify some factors which might contribute to more extreme behavior threatening the community. In an attempt to understand these issues, which are often hidden from the public discourse, we have started our analysis by first examining feelings and perceptions of insecurity, followed by concrete concerns related to extremism and radicalism.

Insecurities in Novi Pazar

Both young people and community representatives from Novi Pazar stress that the city is marked by continuous and numerous insecurities. Experiences of these insecurities are highly pervasive and influence the daily lives of people in the city. Here, we are going to present some perceptions of the main security threats which are perceived as the most invasive. In particular, we are going to look at these threats from the perspective of
youth, which can in turn contextualize their position and the environment of insecurities within which they are growing up.

**Economic Insecurity**

Economic insecurity is highly complex and intertwined with numerous other forms of insecurity. As it can be seen from the short overview of the municipality, the unemployment rate is very high in Novi Pazar, while this percentage among youth is even higher. The unemployment issue is linked to insecurities both for the daily lives of people, as well as the functioning of institutions. People are faced with numerous problems related to providing for their daily livelihood, ensuring housing, having the opportunity to participate in after-school activities and hobbies, having quality-time with family, and increased stress and pressures.

Young people in Novi Pazar are growing up with very limited possibilities to have a secure economic position within the society. In most cases, they start thinking about leaving the city and going to work abroad while already in high school, as they see no other opportunities to find employment. This is again related to the ability to create an independent life with the family, for which housing and employment is needed.

**Institutional Insecurity**

Widespread corruption, lack of the rule of law, and lack of stable and well-functioning institutions (e.g. administrative burden and backlogged cases in courts) was recognized by the respondents, together with economic insecurity, as one of the main threats causing vulnerability on a daily basis. These insecurities are described
as threats in almost all institutions in Novi Pazar, and most notably, the police, courts and prosecution, and the local self-government. As a result, the overall perception of justice and fairness within the community is seen as highly selective. Rather than the rule of law, other norms and values are seen as imperative for governing the legitimacy of power.

In the case of youth, this institutional insecurity is noted from very early on. Already in primary school (and increasingly in secondary schools), children notice unequal distribution of power and selective implementation of the rule of law or regulation. Here, youth is already very well aware of how “things really work”, and that there are alternative structures that might have an impact on relationships and results. For instance, several respondents mention how they are frustrated by the fact that those who perpetrated the most severe forms of violence in school are not punished because their parents have a good relationship with school administration, while someone who does not have these kind of connections can be punished for a small discretion. Another example, one young boy stressed that although he works very hard for his grades, they do not reflect his achievement because other pupils might get the same grades through some form of bribery. Young people thereby form an understanding that their personal efforts within the school system or other areas of the society might not be sufficient in order to improve their position, or for them to work towards their goals.

Physical and Personal Insecurity

Although people feel relatively secure in their daily lives, respondents estimate that violence and crime is increasingly threatening people’s daily experience of security. Violence against women,
peer violence among youth, and violence related to criminal and political group conflicts, are starting to be perceived as more prominent threats to physical and personal insecurity. More notably, these threats are gaining more “space” within the city limits, accessing areas considered to be the most secure, including the home and the schools. Illicit drugs and other substances are also becoming more widespread, especially threatening youth, which can be considered a direct threat to personal security.

Youth is hereby increasingly exposed to conflicts and violence. During focus groups with teachers (from the previous research in 2014), teachers stressed that children are starting to bring weapons to school and that physical altercations are rising. Current institutional mechanisms aimed at preventing and sanctioning youth violence are not considered as well-functioning, leading to a normalization, and in some cases even glorification of violence. Violence is seen as one alternative way through which relationships and positions among youth are formed.

Other: Health and Ecological Insecurity

Although highly present in Novi Pazar, threats related to the health sector and ecological insecurities are not prominent in the insecurity discourse among youth. Still, it is important to mention that they are recognized by the broader community. Most notably, access to health care services is considered limited, while ecological threats (predominantly related to illegal waste landfills) are considered inadequately managed.

18 Violence can here be understood as psychological, physical, economic and sexual violence.
Risks and Threats Related to Extremism and Radicalism

The above described human security threats can create an environment wherein youth lives in constant insecurity. In economic terms, respondents stress that there is a lack of opportunities for young people to find employment, to develop themselves professionally and to find their place within the community. At the same time, institutional insecurities and the lack of the rule of law creates a space where they are insecure. If young people do not feel that their invested energy towards a profession or career goal has merit and can contribute to their advancement within the community (in social and economic terms), other norms and principles based on personal interests can take preference. For instance, youth participation in political parties is seen as an alternative way, and according to some respondents a more secure way, to advance in society. The power of the political party, rather than the rule of law, will thereby be the main source of security. Still, the feeling of injustice and the feeling that they are forced to accept this inequality seem to be the most frustrating to young respondents in this fieldwork. Although they do not want to conform to it, they feel that it is difficult to find a different way. This is also the reason why many see migration as the only good option for their future.

This general lack of opportunity and security, together with the overall disbelief in change, creates widespread apathy among youth. Although the young people involved in the research stress that young people in general still have some energy and want to get engaged towards change, this is often not manifested. In many cases, they feel that they have to adopt the community divisions (especially the political divisions), often stemming from preexisting affiliations of their family members, in order to have group support for employment
and securing some basic rights. Although this does not mean that young people necessarily always adapt to these existing structure, some respondents expressed a frustration with these relationships.

I am in those years when I’m supposed to create a family. If a man does not have the housing issue resolved, the job issue… So, what is he supposed to do later, on what is he supposed to live? Then he doesn’t feel like staying.

Students, they are the largest volunteer group in political parties, because they know, if I finish (studies), at least he hopes, that he will find some form of employment. But it’s impossible, even for 10%. No matter how much the party might want it, it’s simply impossible. I was just watching that recently, some gathering of a political party. A lot of young people gathered, it was really interesting, they were talking about how great they are, this and that… But I was really sad. How many showed up. I assume that 80% of those who came only showed up with the hope of getting a job. I don’t know if 10% of them had love for the party or their beliefs.

Division lines across political, religious and ethnic affiliation or belonging is one of the most notable characteristics of Novi Pazar. These groupings have different meanings and are articulated differently dependent on the setting, but in all cases they are creating a segregated society. For instance, several young people stressed how the community is divided according ethnic lines whereby citizens with Serb and Bosniak ethnic background often go to different cafés, vote for different parties, and romantic relationships across ethnic lines are not considered desirable.

In a similar fashion, political and religious affiliation are sometimes described as important causes for group division. Some of
the examples stressed include that some representatives of the different groups might consciously sit on different tables in cafes, or in more serious cases, be unwilling to initiate a dialogue or cooperation with certain groups/members of the other groups. As one respondent articulated, the first thing you get asked when getting to know someone new is: *Who are you for?* This phrase is referring to people’s political affiliations and signifies an expectation that this affiliation exists.

Not only are these divisions often defined and marked by segregated groups, according to respondents sometimes they are also marked by high levels of antagonism. Several respondents stressed how there is an increased intolerance to differences among groups, without space for developing common interest and symbolic space for dialogues and exchange. Respondents noted that the most frustrating part of the divisions in Novi Pazar is that everything has to be black and white. This refers to everything, from religious divisions and traditions within the Islamic community (from the institutional level to smaller divisions within a mosque) to political affiliations and youth activism. As respondents have stressed:

*We are divided in every way. There is not one single area where we are not divided and where we are not fighting.*

*90% is ideologically the same, only 1% is different. But that 1% is put to the forefront.*

*If you do not think the same as me, then you are against me.*

*What is most notable about these perceptions and positions is that they are increasingly manifested in the form of direct opposition, they are personalized, and they are becoming uncompromising.*
If you cannot persuade someone to think the same way as you do, the conversation stops.

When personal characterizations are attacked in the form of being a “good” or “bad” Muslim or an honest or dishonest man or woman, then the divisions and oppositions gain an emotional and personal character that hinders an informed talk on issues. Moreover, they are closely linked to feelings of justice or injustice, equality and inequality, honesty and dishonestly, legitimacy and illegitimacy. In effect, negotiations on these issues are considered very difficult.

Politics is a bit different here. If you curse at his political leader, a representative from his party, it’s like you cursed at his entire family.

These characterizations then often spill into discourses of violence, or, in some cases in particular, into direct psychological violence. Several respondents expressed how psychological violence across group affiliation is very common.

Respondents indicate everyday presence of violent discourses among various important actors in the community – political leaders, religious leaders, media. Hate and violent propaganda speech by leaders in several communities is stressed as a prominent threat by numerous representatives in Novi Pazar. They explain how this speech is evident in media and in speeches of political leaders and religious representatives. Given that the party leaders and religious representatives are considered some of the most influential people when it comes to forming norms and values as well as behaviors and positions of youth, this can be a reason for reproduction of divisions and antagonism.
Then you have how many young people going to one side and how many going to the other side. They are filling them up with hate, saying “they are bad”, and then the other group says “no, no, they are bad”. But really, nobody is bad, they just have different opinions. And then you get this hate and some kind of religious gathering. Instead of going to pray and gain some peace, you are listening to speeches about this guy is bad, that guy is bad… That’s that hate speech. We should protect the youth from this type of hate speech.

One side accuses the other of being servants of the regime, while the other side says that they are a gang that is stealing and taking money away from believers...

Although physical altercations are said to be limited, they can sometimes erupt. More violent altercations are however usually connected to football support groups and their political preferences and views. One respondent expressed how he was afraid of physical attacks after expressing his political view. In this instance, he explained that football supporters are seen, as he says, “soldiers of political leaders or political parties”. He says that although the political leader or party would never admit their connection, they are basically acting on their will. This can also be in the form of destroying someone’s property or just intimidation.

Most often however, respondents stress that violence is expressed through social media. Facebook and other media tools are used to reify divisions and propagate violent slurs and threats across lines.

How do you feel this? Is this something you can see in their attitude, that you are not a “proper” Muslim? Or do you experience this differently?
Yes... But you don’t feel it… You see it on social networks. That’s where you can see it the most. Like... Just look there and you’ll see it all: “They are like this, they are like… Keep away from them! What do you need them for?” Tons of comments like that.

In more severe cases some individual members of the community have felt “attacked” online. Although respondents who have experienced these types of attacks believe that they are mostly threats that will not be materialized, they do feel that their freedoms are limited in expressing different views and opinions. Moreover, they stress that anything that is different is considered punishable. Some young respondents also stressed their concern with the question about who decides what is acceptable and what is not acceptable in Novi Pazar. They explained that people in Novi Pazar are not completely free in their choices. Expressions of sexuality, football club preferences, choice of which holidays to celebrate, and whether or not to celebrate New Year’s Eve, can all be instigators of great controversy or even direct opposition.

“Nobody would ever come out as gay here in Novi Pazar. It just never happened.”

If we look at these manifestations of antagonism and violence in light of overall normalization of violence among youth, the risk increases. Focus groups discussions with youth show an increase in peer violence among youth, while institutional mechanisms and regulations (within school, police and courts) which should sanctions these types of violence are missing or are ineffective. In turn, this signals to the community that violence is a legitimate form of communication among youth, which is leading to its further reproduction.
Conclusions

When one young man was asked to describe what he thought was “extreme” in Novi Pazar, he has answered with a question “What is not extreme?” This answer denotes his feeling that opinions, positions and discourses in Novi Pazar are sharpening, and that extremism is becoming mainstream. Extremist ideas, or ideas that are not open to dialogue and change are becoming part of all spheres of society. Overall research findings also suggest that deep insecurities connected to the daily lives of citizens, sharpening demarkation lines and conflict among groups are perceived as important factors creating an environment where it is difficult to find common community interests and work on solutions that can benefit the broader public good.

The main problems identified by respondents themselves and analysis of connections in relation to extremism and radicalism show several risk factors which call for particular attention. These include:

- Human insecurities – especially economic (unemployment and poverty) and institutional insecurities (corruption and lack of rule of law), where people live with a constant feeling of deprivation and injustice;
- Apathy – overall lack of engagement and empathy;
• Divisions and “othering” - formation of groups along political, religious and ethnic lines is highly present, and in turn, influences numerous spheres of public and private life;

• Antagonism and hate speech - increased intolerance to differences among groups without space for development of common interest and symbolic space for dialogue and exchange;

• Normalization and legitimacy of violence – lack of (functional) institutional mechanisms to prevent and sanction violence, and overall growth and acceptance of violence as a form of communication among youth;

• Social exclusion and isolation – exclusion and isolation of certain groups from political, economic, social and religious life in Novi Pazar, as well as centralization of power.

In light of the above mentioned, the examples put forth as possible manifestations of more extreme and radical divisions and events, which might form the basis for further escalation, are increasingly alarming. Ethnic tensions rooted in feelings of injustice, acceptance of violence, conflict across political divisions are just a few examples of possible tensions which can increase risks of extremism and radicalism, and in turn, insecurity. In order to prevent youth growing up in this environment to reproduce existing structures and positions, important preventive steps need to be taken. Moreover, an additional quantitative research can contribute to map specific factors influencing youth extremism and radicalism on a representative level of Novi Pazar.
Institutional Capacities for prevention of extremism and radicalism in Novi Pazar

This document presents a qualitative assessment of the institutional capacities for prevention of extremism and radicalism in Novi Pazar. The analysis focuses on the perceptions of community members and institutional representatives.
Introduction

Novi Pazar is one of the most underdeveloped regions in Serbia, faced with numerous human security threats which create an insecure environment for the everyday lives of its citizens. Widespread poverty and unemployment, stagnant development, social exclusion, rise in crime and an unstable political environment are just some of these insecurities. Additionally, Novi Pazar is one of the most culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse areas in the country, thus creating additional challenges and tensions. Although the region is still relatively stable, numerous insecurities suggest the need for coordinated measures in order to prevent possible downside risks. Some excesses of violence and increasing social isolation can be already seen as important indicators of possible threats, and considerable steps need to be made now in order to curb the escalation of these trends and the growth of extremism and radicalism within the community.

With this in mind, the main goal of this assessment is to critically examine the current capacities of institutions in Novi Pazar to prevent extremism and radicalism.

For this assessment, current regulations and policy guidelines have been reviewed, followed by an overview of institutions which could be part of a multisectoral response in the prevention of ex-
Integrated Response of the Community to Human Security challenges in Novi Pazar

tremism and radicalism, and finally, a qualitative analysis of the current capacities of institutions and possible barriers in their work. In the end, concrete recommendations will be formulated, which can serve as guidelines for the next steps towards developing an integrated institutional response to these threats.

This document has been prepared by SeConS – Development Initiative Group, a think-tank organization, for the purpose of Cultural Center DamaD. DamaD recognized the need to develop the first steps towards strengthening the institutional capacities and developing integrated responses to security challenges, including extremism and radicalism in the region.

For more information: www.kcdamad.org & www.secons.net
Methodology

This research has been conducted using qualitative research methods. The research consisted of several key components:

- **Desk research**: Review and analysis of current policy documents (strategies, action plans etc.) as well as collection of some contextual data for Novi Pazar (sociodemography, political structures etc.).

- **Focus group discussion (FGD)**: A FGD was organized with community representatives, including representatives of the local self-government, the judiciary, Islamic Community, elementary and secondary education, Universities in Novi Pazar, Center for Social Welfare, sports clubs and civil society organizations (CSOs).

- **In-depth interviews**: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with two groups of respondents:
  - Individual interviews were also conducted with representatives of some institutions – Local Security Council, NGOs, and Student Council – in order to gain additional accounts of institutional capacities and their roles.
  - In-depth interviews with youth representatives were conducted in order to gain firsthand accounts on their personal experience with institutions in the local community.
Integrated Response of the Community to Human Security challenges in Novi Pazar

- **Validation meetings**: A validation meeting was organized in order to assess the main output of this research, and to discuss the next steps in developing mechanisms of prevention.

This methodology allows for different actors to fully express their opinions about extremism and radicalism, and, consequently, their role or possibilities of preventing extremism and radicalism on the local level. In sum, the research will illustrate the main obstacles and barriers in the future work of institutions in this area, and, consequently, enable the formulation of high-quality recommendations for the improvement of their work.
Human Security, Extremism and Radicalism

Since both extremism and radicalism are considered highly sensitive issues, both in the political and academic arena, the researchers have approached the subject through a human security perspective. Here, the emphasis is on a bottom-up understanding of extremism and radicalism, and in this case, institutional capacities for preventing these threats. By focusing on the subjective experience of vulnerability, we can gain in-depth insights on the contextual aspects of this subject.

Human Security

Human security is a relatively new paradigm for approaching the problem of security. Contrary to the traditional concepts of security, which revolve around the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, human security recognizes that the security of individuals is essential in building stable and peaceful societies. The definition of the Commission on Human Security is as followed:
Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.\textsuperscript{19}

This individual security is multifaceted and depends upon the interrelatedness of multiple different phenomena. The main objective of human security initiatives is thereby to protect individuals and groups from a range of severe and pervasive harms which affect their ability to lead tolerable lives. Hence, human security focuses on addressing and preventing risks to individuals’ and groups’ physical, material and psychological being, summarized as ensuring freedom from fear, freedom from want and dignity.

**Extremism**

In general, extremism refers to activities – beliefs, attitudes, feelings, strategies – which are out of the ordinary. Simply defined, extremism refers to beliefs and ideas that are not considered correct by the majority of people. These activities are most often closely connected to an ideology, which is either political or religious, and outside of the mainstream. These ideologies are thereby in opposition to common and widespread morals, norms and values of a given society or setting.

Extremism can be used to refer to political ideologies that oppose a society’s core values and principles. In the context of liberal democracies this could be applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and universal human rights. The term can also be used to describe the methods through which political actors attempt to realize their aims, that is, by using means that show disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others.\textsuperscript{20}

Radicalism

As in the case of extremism, radicalism and radicalization are also very sensitive topics. They refer to the process by which illegal means or violent means are used as a tool in the political process.

The process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes (radicalism).\textsuperscript{21}

As in the case of extremism, radicalism usually has a political component which suggests the aim for a large-scale social or political change. Here however, the issues of violence and illegal


\textsuperscript{21} C. Crossett and J. Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant psychological and sociological concepts (Ft. Meade, MD: U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, September 2010), 10
means for realizing goals become more central. Traditionally, political radicalism has referred to either left or right wing political streams with revolutionary political agendas, while religious radicalism has been linked to fundamentalism and strict adherence to theological doctrines. Hence, the above definitions can be linked to numerous different groups with different ideologies, agendas, structures etc.
Municipality of Novi Pazar

Basic Info

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>100,410</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>742 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Raška</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population</td>
<td>68.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>135.32 inhabitants per square km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sociodemographic characteristics

According to the Census from 2011, the Municipality of Novi Pazar has 100,410 registered inhabitants. The population is made up of 48.8% men and 50.2% women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>49,984</td>
<td>48.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50,426</td>
<td>50.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,410</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In relation to ethnic identity, 77.1% of inhabitants identify themselves as Bosniaks, making it the largest ethnic group in the region. This is followed by Serbs (16.2%) Muslims (4%), and other (2.7%).

Novi Pazar is also the youngest municipality in Serbia. The young population, up to 19 years of age, makes up 32% of the local population. The average age of the population is 33 years old, which is far below of the average level for Serbia. This is also confirmed by positive natural increase rate of + 8.6% according to the Census of 2011.

The two main religious communities in Novi Pazar are the Christian Orthodox Church (16%) and Islam (82%). Since 2007, the Republic of Serbia has parallel Islamic Community administrations:

– the Islamic Community in Serbia, based in Novi Pazar and headed by Mevlud Dudić, with the spiritual center in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

– the Islamic Community of Serbia, based in Belgrade and headed by Adem Zilkić.

**Economic Situation**

The Municipality of Novi Pazar is classified as third level development municipality according to The level of development of municipalities. This means that development is ranging from 60% to 80% of the national development average.\(^{25}\)

In relation to employment, the municipality is in a relatively unfavorable position. In the year 2013 the employment rate amounted to 15.9%, which is a decrease compared to the 19.5% in the year 2011.\(^{26}\) This unfavorable economic situation is also reflected in the employment numbers. According to the Census from 2011, 11,448 people are unemployed, suggesting an unemployment rate of 36.87% on the territory of Novi Pazar.\(^{27}\) Unofficial data suggest that this percentage is even higher, while the unemployment rate among youth is around 70%.

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\(^{27}\) Statistical office of the Republic of Serbia, 2014, Municipalities and Regions in Serbia
Most employees work within the education sector (1,972 persons), followed by the sector of process manufacturing (1,687 persons), wholesale and retail trade (1,558 persons) and health and social care (1,510 persons).28

Political Structure

Novi Pazar is governed by a city assembly composed of 47 assembly members, a mayor and a vice-mayor. After the last election held in 2012, the local assembly is composed of the parties presented in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/coalition</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Novi Pazar - Rasim Ljajić (SDP, SDPS, DS)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Together - Emir Elfić</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandžak (BDZS)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent members</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United regions of Serbia - Dr Mirsad Derlek</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let’s start up Novi Pazar - Tomislav Nikolić (SNS, NS, DSS)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Official site of the Municipality: www.novipazar.rs

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Policy Framework

In this section, we will take a closer look at the policy framework on the national and local level. Here, the main goal is to assess to what extent extremism and radicalism are taken into account within this framework, and what existing regulations are in place for either preventing their growth, or sanctioning acts that can be classified as extremist and radical.

National Policy Framework

There is no coherent strategy for combating radicalism and extremism on the national level in Serbia, but there are several laws and policies which should be accounted for when developing further policy framework.

➢ **National Strategy for Security (2009)** emphasizes that terrorism is one of the most profound risks and threats to global, regional and national security. “Modern terrorism is global in scope and associated with violent religious extremism.” The strategy suggests that Serbia may be a target of terrorist activity both directly and indirectly, with special emphasis on the connection between terrorism and all forms of organized, transnational and cross-border crime. A significant risk factor emphasized in the strategy is national and religious extrem-
ism, which has its roots in ethnic and religious conflicts. It is also suggested that slow democratization of economic and political processes can significantly contribute to growing ethnic tensions and their potential to grow into conflicts. The Strategy’s aims stressed the need for cooperation between the state, churches and religious communities, supporting interfaith dialogue in order to weaken motivation for religious fanaticism and extremism. This would strengthen the social cohesion of society, and thus the national security state.

- **National Strategy for Prevention and Protection of Discrimination (2013)** prescribes taking active measures to prevent the spread of hate speech against members of religious communities and to improve public safety of their members, property and religious symbols. This includes, but is not limited to, measures for strengthening tolerance towards religious communities, and stresses the importance of dialogue between religious communities and citizens.

- **National Strategy for Youth (2015)** recognizes crime, violence and traffic accidents as severe threats to the security of youth. In particular, it has been stressed that violence is becoming increasingly common among young people and in public places e.g. sporting events, restaurants, bars. It also highlights extreme forms of discrimination and intolerance among youth. The Strategy also refers to key measures aimed at increasing a culture of tolerance and stopping violence across different group affiliations, ideologies and identities.

- **Law for Prohibiting Organization of Neo-Nazi and Fascist events and Banning Use of Neo-Nazi and Fascist Symbols** regulates the prohibition of events, symbols, signs or any other activities of neo-Nazi or fascist organizations and
associations whereby constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens are violated.

- **Law Against Discrimination** regulates the general prohibition of discrimination and prescribes methods for protection against discrimination. This law establishes the Commissioner for Equality as an autonomous and independent state body which should implement this law. Serious forms of discrimination are inequality, hatred and intolerance on the basis of national, racial or religious affiliation, language, political affiliation, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation and disability (Art. 13). Accordingly, the law prohibits conspiracy to commit acts which are discriminatory, that is, the operation of an organization or group aimed at violating the Constitution, rules of international law and the law guaranteeing freedoms and rights or incitement to national, racial, religious and other hatred, discord or intolerance (Art. 10).

- **The Criminal Code** defines the level of penalties for those who, for reasons of national or ethnic origin, race or religion, due to differences in political or other opinion, sex, language, education, social status, social origin, property or other personal properties deny or limit the rights of man and the citizen established by the Constitution, laws or other regulations, general acts or ratified international treaties (Art. 128). The Criminal Code provides penalties for those who prevent or restrict the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief, prevent or interfere with the performance of religious rites or force another to express his religious beliefs (Art. 131). Additionally, it also prescribes penalties for those who incite ethnic, racial or religious hatred or intolerance among people and ethnic communities living in Serbia (Art. 317). Articles
386a and 386b also sanction participation and/or organization of participation (recruiting) in wars and armed conflicts in foreign states.

Two decisions of the Constitutional Court also reflect the State’s readiness to put these laws into action due to actions related to human and minority rights violations and inciting national and religious hatred:

- 2012: Decision to prohibit the work of the Associations “Obraz”
- 2011: Decision to prohibit the work of the secret organization “Nacionalni stroj”

Local Policy Framework

Although the national policy level is binding also for the local level across Serbia, there are no contextualized local level policy inputs with reference to extremism and radicalism. The main policy document on the local level include:

- Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development of the City of Novi Pazar for the Period from 2008 to 2016; Action Plan of the City of Novi Pazar for the Period from 2012 to 2016.

29 Far-right organization connected to violent activities and antihuman rights ideology.
30 Far-right organization formed in 2004 and considered to be spreading nationalist, racial and religious hate.
➢ Action plan for Improvement of the Position of Women and Promotion of Gender Equality in the City of Novi Pazar 2012-2015.


Although there are measures aimed at countering insecurities and vulnerabilities, both to the general population and to specific vulnerable groups, there are no concrete measures aimed at preventing extremism and radicalism.

It is important to mention that the Local Security Council does plan to develop a Local Security Strategy for the forthcoming period, which could be an important step in recognizing this subject in the municipality.
Institutions in Novi Pazar

Institutions are essential for improving human security and preventing extremism and radicalism. Many of the important institutions for implementing and instigating institutional response towards negative trends already exist in Novi Pazar.

All these institutions and organizations play an integral role in prevention of security risks in numerous ways. In the most holistic way, they can create an environment in which risk factors leading to security threats, including extremism and radicalism, can be mitigated, and they can present institutions in which youth can have trust. On a more short term basis, each of them can try to prevent and recognize security threats, including extremism and radicalism, within their field of work, and identify their responsibility as well as their contribution in countering the problem.
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Institutional Capacities in Novi Pazar

Although almost all institutions are faced with the problem of extremism and radicalism in their work, current institutional capacities targeting extremism and radicalism are rather limited. There are no formal regulations for responding to challenges related to extremism and radicalism, leaving current responses to ad hoc collaborations by individual institutions. This is not surprising, considering the fact it has not been a priority within existing national policy frameworks and institutional guidelines. Still, the representatives of different institutions recognized extremism and radicalism as a growing problem in Novi Pazar, which should be paid attention to. For instance, several respondents explained how there are certain groups that are radicalizing and isolating themselves, without any oversight of the broader community. Moreover, one representative of the Islamic Community stated that the issue of extremism and radicalism will only get worse. Other respondents recognize the radicalization of media and hate speech as an important indicator of extremism in the public domain. There are however several barriers which are limiting their work in this area.
Lack of Resources

Most notably, institutions are faced with a lack of recourses to combat basic problems and security threats, let alone those contributing to radicalization and extremism. This lack is evident in terms of human resources and capacities, economic resources and knowledge resources in terms of policy frameworks and guidelines. A representative from the court in Novi Pazar explained:

The main cause (for badly functioning institutions) is a lack of resources. One country cannot, one materialistic (capitalist) country cannot allow itself not to stand behind its institutions. As I once heard at a convention, there is no good country that is a cheap country. A good state needs to have paid its institutions. Unfortunately, we live in a state where the government can’t do that. There are no means to pay a sufficient number of people in the judicial office, both in the courts and in prosecutors’ offices, and in other organs.

Several institutions (especially Centers for Social Welfare, schools, police and courts) expressed this concern and how it contributes to overwork and, in some cases, physical inability to do everything required. A representative of the Local Security Council, which is coordinated on a voluntary basis, also stressed the difficulty to foster results under such circumstances.

Institutional Insecurity

Overall institutional insecurity, the lack of the rule of law (reflected in the feeling that citizens cannot exercise their rights to a full extent and that they are unequally treated before the law) and regulations within institutions themselves decrease both the legitimacy and
trustworthiness of these institutions in the eyes of almost all respondents. And increasingly alarming, institutions have been described as important contributor to community division and conflict.

The legislative power is not legislative. It is only there to agree with the decisions of those in executive power.

“You’re smart, you’re creative, but you’re not one of ours” (quoting rejection while job seeking). Look, you know how do you get a job? You either give money, or you are in a party. Those people who get jobs through the party. They are often not the most creative and best qualified in some area.

Corruption, unequal treatment and discrimination are just some of the words used to characterize institutions in general. When these characterizations affect local government bodies, police, the judicial system, then there is a perception of an overall institutional breakdown than can neither recognize possible threats to the community at large (rather than individual groups), nor sanction possible risky behaviors. Moreover, many respondents stress how this creates general feeling of injustice among citizens, and youth in particular.

Lack of Responsibility and Accountability

Although most institutional representatives recognize many of these human insecurities, including acts or threats of extremism and radicalism within the community, they do not recognize their own responsibility in preventing this trend from growing, or the role they play in its reproduction. Extremist behavior connected to isolated and radicalized community groups, to violent conflicts
between football supporters, to murders or acts of violence in the city center, peer violence among youth are often considered to be the responsibility of someone else or of another institution, or as something outside the realm of their institutional capacities, which is understandable but not very useful for the community.

I have never heard X, or Y, or whomever saying: “Yes, we made a mistake, here we could have done something, we tried but we didn’t succeed”. No, we are always the best in the world, and everyone else is responsible for what isn’t good.

For instance, one teacher expressed how peer violence is connected to youth outside of the school system which attack youth within the schools, and that the best prevention mechanism is in assigning a police officer to each school. Similarly, a representative of the local self-government expressed how the decision makers’ hands are tied and that they are powerless in their work due to the dysfunctional institutions such as the police and courts and the lack of local power in relation to national institutions. In the case of controlling conflicts between football supporters, a representative of the football club NP stressed that it is impossible to control these groups, since those conflicts are provoked by a few individuals rather than organized groups, which is the reason why they cannot be controlled.

In this endless circle of finger pointing, as one young respondent remarked, - “In the end, we, the youth, become the guilty ones”. These types of references, although their legitimacy is not under scrutiny in this instance, allow for the responsibility to be diverted to “the other”. Hence, rather than acknowledging their institutional capacities, responsibilities and possibilities to act in accordance to the needs, many institutional representatives do not feel that they should be held accountable.
Antagonism and Conflict Among Institutional Representatives

Evasion of responsibility can also grow into ‘blaming’. A few respondents expressed how negative and conflict-driven speech among groups is also highly evident within institutions as well. Once these personalized and antagonistic discourses become part of institutional discourses, serving the common interest and working together in order to solve community problems and issues becomes very hard. For instance, one of the main problems of the work of the Local Security Council is the lack of trust among its representatives.

The organization and work of the Security Council is aimed at creating a good atmosphere of mutual trust among local government representatives and representatives of other institutions… I’m working on creating this atmosphere of trust, but it’s very difficult, because we now have a new phenomenon. We have an active Islamic community in political life, in public life, and eventually, in the Assembly of Novi Pazar. And I think that there is an intention, from their side, to organize a society in the way that they think it is right. And then you have the reaction of some other people who do not think the same way. If you do not have enough subtlety to negotiate some of these differences and intentions, then you get into a conflict, and you don’t need conflicts… The Council should give advice as to how to overcome these conflicts...

Relationships among institutional representatives rather than the institutional structures they are supposed to represent, hereby become the main merit by which the Security Council can function. Moreover, once these relationships are faced with institutional changes e.g. elections and regulation within the justice system, building lasting relationships in a division-driven environment becomes hard.
Similar division within the Islamic community is considered to be an obstacle for having an accountable institutional Islamic community. As one representatives stressed, having a united Islamic community that can be responsible for both ideas and behavior of its members, would be an option to counteract certain negative trend.

There simply aren’t any institutions that we can hold into account. […] There should be one Islamic community, because if there is one Islamic community, then you can hold this Islamic community into account. Hence, for all those extremist ideas, radical ideas that are unfortunately coming back and growing… […] I don’t see a different way to stop them unless through responsible education and institutions who have legitimacy and integrity.

Still, it is important to problematize this statement and to ask the question: What makes one institution legitimate, and what can be described as integrity? Considering all the demarcation lines within the community and the current discourse on differences, legitimacy seems to be connected to the power rather than the rule of law.

We know what happens here when elections are coming up. It leads to some excesses, to some instability, people pulling guns at each other… We are missing a political culture, and there is no dialogue. There is no political dialogue, culture, where we can give our personal opinions and be treated with respect.

As in other group divisions, hate speech and conflict driven media is seen as an instigator of these institutional relationships. In this sense, conflicts that might happen within the mosques or cafés can be brought through media to include the broader public, political and religious positions. In turn, the media as an institution becomes a part of these conflicts. In light of this, it is important to point out that the very representatives of these institutions (especially schools,
religious community and political parties) are considered to be, apart from the family, the most influential ones when it comes to forming the opinions and attitudes of youth. Young respondents suggested that religious and political leaders, together with teachers, are the main people who can have a significant effect on them.

Teachers are definitely the most influential. I remember one of my teachers and how wonderful he was. But it is rare to find a good teacher that inspires you…

Consequently, it is of special importance that institutions as structures and representatives of the institutions (schools, police, local self-government, religious communities etc.) recognize how their actions or behavior can be internalized by young people, in both positive and negative ways. For instance, unequal sanctioning of youth violence by the policy, judiciary and the school itself, can contribute to acceptance and normalization of discrimination among youth.

In sum, numerous barriers and problems are characterizing current efforts of institutions at creating a more secure society and preventing possible growth of extremism and radicalism.
Conclusions

Overall, institutional capacities for preventing extremism and radicalism are rather limited. On the one side, the policy framework is only partially targeting these threats, while on the other side institutions are faced with numerous obstacles in their daily work. Some key points can be made on the basis of this explorative research. These points are focused on some of the disadvantages of current institutional mechanisms recognized by representatives from institutions and community representatives. They include:

- Lack of targeted policy framework on national and local level – especially in the form of guidelines and strategies related to extremism and radicalism;
- Institutional insecurity – lack of the rule of law, lack of sustainable institutions;
- Lack of recourses – institutions are generally in a very difficult position having a lack of the basic tools necessary to implement services, especially Centers for Social Welfare, schools, police and courts;
- Lack of responsibility – overall lack of identifying and general awareness of institutional responsibility and shifting of responsibilities (blaming “the other” factors, elements or actors) among institutions;
• Antagonism and personalization – a personalized discourse targeting characteristics of groups and individuals limit the possibility of cooperation more than plans and regulations.

U cilju prevazilaženja postojećih ograničenja i razvijanja funkcionalnih i održivih institucionalnih mehanizama za prevenciju ekstremizma i nacionalizma, trebalo bi preduzeti važne korake.
Recommendations

Recommendation for possible interventions and concrete steps can be divided into two groups with different targets. On the one side, recommendations for direct future work with youth, and on the other side, recommendations targeting institutions, institutional representatives and service providers directly.

Recommendations for work with youth:

• Create a space wherein youth can have the opportunity for an open dialogue about some of the issues and problems most important to them – in schools, universities, public debates and panels;

• Raise youth awareness of the possible dangers and threats linked to radicalization and violence – through media, in schools and universities, public events, through political parties and religious groups. Also specifically target youth awareness of the effect of violence and discrimination online (in virtual space);

• Develop peer educational programs aimed at increasing a culture of tolerance and peaceful conflict resolution (e.g. youth peace building activities summer schools, youth volunteering etc.) – through schools, CSOs and youth offices, political parties and religious group;
• Give more space for youth to develop and carry out youth activities – both through allocation of municipality budgets aimed at youth, school activities, as well as overall community openness which will give youth a voice.

Recommendations for institutions and service providers:

• Raise awareness of decision makers on the main threats and dangers of further extremism and radicalization of youth;
• Increase accountability of institutions in recognizing their role and responsibility for overall security in the community, including prevention of extremism and radicalism among youth;
• Raise awareness of the effect of hate-speech and antagonistic discourse by community representatives (religious and political leaders, media, teachers), and in turn, public sanctioning of such rhetoric;
• Improve overall institutional security – e.g. through strengthening the procedures for prevention of corruption and by developing and promoting nondiscriminatory practices in public institutions;
• Develop new approaches to combating security challenges in the community in line with local needs e.g. by adopting a local strategy for security;
• Strengthen inter-sectoral cooperation aimed at improving human security in the community;
• Establishing a referral mechanism (formalized institutional linkages) for protecting vulnerable youth from being drawn into extremism and providing direct support to those already affected;
• Detailed protocols for institutional responses to extremism and radicalism;

• Increase the capacities of the Novi Pazar’s Security Council to base its work and its policies on the concept of human security, including a gender perspective, as well as the aspects of extremism and radicalism;

• Develop a protocol for cooperation between institutions on the problem of extremism and radicalism with well-defined responsibilities;

• Institutionalize the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) that can serve as a tool for recognizing youth at risk extremism and radicalism;

• Develop multi-agency support packages for prevention of extremism and radicalism in the community with the specific aim to: strengthening community cohesion, spread of positive messages and de-stigmatization of the community (both from within Novi Pazar and in connection to broader society), promotion of tolerance and non-violence, deconstruction of extreme ideological narratives, and similar. These support packages should be developed in cooperation with representatives from all relevant institutions and be local ownership.
Vulnerability Assessment Framework
Introduction

Extremism and radicalism, especially when they escalate into violence, are a threat to peace and harmony in the community. Identifying the causes and the various risks that contribute to this phenomenon are therefore crucial for the broader security and prosperity of the community. Given that young people in our communities are at highest risk of potentially developing extremist views and behavior, while at the same time being the most accessible for implementing preventive measures as a social group, it is necessary to develop institutional mechanisms which can serve as a support to the prevention and reduction of the risk of extremism and radicalism.

Bearing in mind that extremism and radicalism are very complex and sensitive social issues, it is important to approach the problem through different channels and keep in mind that these phenomena are often highly contextualized and conditioned by specific social structures and relationships. Given this complexity, this document has been developed in accordance with the research related to the recognition of risk factors to extremism and radicalism among youth in Novi Pazar, as well as the capacity assessment of the current institutional framework. This assessment was prepared by SeConS – Development Initiative Group for the project “Integrated Response and Building of Resilience Against Violent Extremism
and Radicalism in Sandžak”, implemented by the Cultural Center DamaD and funded by the Swiss Embassy in Belgrade.

The main goal of the Framework for Assessing Vulnerability of Youth to Extremism and Radicalism in Novi Pazar is to provide conceptual support and guidance for institutions and community representatives in their efforts to identify potential at-risk youth (from extremism and radicalism) and especially their involvement in groups that can be defined as extreme and radical. Identifying vulnerabilities is the first step in a series of measures needed to combat these social phenomena and possible negative consequences for the community, especially young people.
### Target institutions

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### Development of the Framework

This Vulnerability Assessment Framework is a localized version of the Framework developed as part of the Prevent strategy of Great Britain.\(^{31}\) This document has been localized in parallel with deeper exploration of risk factors associated with extremism and radicalism of youth in

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Novi Pazar, as well as the existing institutional mechanisms to combat these risks. The goal of this approach was oriented towards developing a framework which responds to local circumstances, characteristics and risks. Only by understanding the local particularities, rooted in the circumstances identified in the community and the problems identified in the community, we can develop measures which can have an effect.

It is important to note that the extremism and radicalism risks are here seen in their interconnection with the possible negative effects of violent extremism. These attitudes and possible violent behavior often develop in groups who share same opinions and attitudes. The focus of the Framework is therefore to recognize young people who are at risk of developing these type of attitudes and possibly getting involved in groups with extremist and radical attitudes. Consequently, violent extremism is not seen as an isolated case related to individuals but as a result of the acceptance of certain opinions and behavior patterns of particular groups.

Another important component of developing this Framework is local ownership and local recognition of its importance. With that in mind, the consultative process, hosting all community representatives who can share their expertise and opinions, is an essential part of this initiative. This framework was therefore distributed through various channels in the community, while a validation meeting was organized with representatives of various institutions.

**Community Risk Factors – Push Factors Towards Extremism and Radicalism**

The research has identified several community risk factors which are important in understanding possible drivers of extremism and radicalism. These include:
• **Human insecurities** – especially economic and institutional insecurities create a space where other demarcation lines and hierarchies separate from the rule of law regulated relationships, and where people live with a constant feeling of injustice;

• **Longstanding conflicts** which have not been resolved;

• **Apathy** – overall lack of engagement and empathy;

• **Divisions and ‘othering’** - formation of groups along political, religious, and ethnic lines is highly present, and in turn, influences all spheres of public and private life;

• **Antagonism and hate speech** - increased intolerance to differences among groups without space for development of common interest and symbolic space for dialogue and exchange, often expressed in direct hate speech and psychological violence;

• **Normalization and legitimacy of violence** – lack of institutional mechanisms to prevent and sanction violence, and overall growth and acceptance of violence as a form of communication among youth;

• **Social exclusion and isolation** – exclusion and isolation of certain groups from political, economic and social life in Novi Pazar, as well as centralization of power.

When assessing the vulnerability of youth, it is important to keep this push factors in mind as they can instigate:

• Aggression and frustration

• Feelings of injustice and powerlessness

• Feelings of persistent insecurity

• Loss of dignity
- Acceptance of violence as a legitimate tool of communication
- Lack of trust in institutions and the community in general

This vulnerabilities are operationalized in relation to pull factors that can influence youth to develop extremist and radical ideas, behavior and the sense of community.

**Vulnerability Assessment Framework for Youth in Novi Pazar**

The Framework for Assessing Vulnerability of Youth to Extremism and Radicalism has been structured according to three key dimensions for assessing the level of risk. These include:

1. **ENGAGEMENT** within a group, cause or ideology
2. **INTENT** to cause harm
3. **CAPABILITY** to cause harm

These dimensions need to be understood separately, as each of these dimensions presents a certain level of risk of violent extremism. For example, it has proved possible that an individual who is engaged within the risk groups might not intent to cause damage. Moreover, an individual that intends to use harm/cause damage, might not be included/integrated in the risk group. Experience has also shown that it is possible not to be open to causing harm while still having sympathy for the cause of the group.

In the following section we will present factors that can be used to assess youth at-risk of extremism and radicalism and inclusion in groups who have supported these attributes. They will be presented in relation to all three dimension, and include indicators which can be used for the treath identification.
It is important to note that the indicators and factors presented are not final and that the vulnerability itself can manifest in other ways. There is not just one path leading to violent extremism, nor is there a simple profile of those who are involved in these groups. It should therefore not be assumed that the given characteristics and experience necessarily leads individuals to become violent extremists, nor that these indicators are the only source of information needed to assess vulnerability.

Engagement Within a Group, Cause or Ideology

Engagement factors are sometimes referred to as psychological hooks. They include needs, susceptibilities, motivations and contextual influences which together can influence youth to become more amenable to violent extremism and extremist groups. They can include:

- Feelings of grievance and injustice
- Feelings of threat
- A need for identity, meaning and belonging
- A desire for status
- A desire for excitement and adventure
- A need to dominate and control others
- Susceptibility to indoctrination
- A desire for political or moral change
- Opportunistic involvement
- Family or friends’ involvement in extremism
- Being at a transitional time of life
- Being influenced or controlled by a group
- Relevant mental health issues
There are a number of behaviors and other indicators that may indicate the presence of the above listed factors. Example indicators which suggest that an individual is engaged with an extremist group, cause or ideology include:

- Spending more time in the company of other suspected extremists
- Changing the style of dressing or personal appearance to fit to the group
- Their day-to-day behavior becoming increasingly centered around an extremist ideology, group or cause
- Loss of interest in other friends and activities not associated with the extremist ideology, group or cause
- Possession of material or symbols associated with an extremist cause;
- Attempts to recruit others to the group/cause/ideology or
- Communication with others that suggest identification with a group/cause/ideology.

**Intent to Cause Harm**

Not all those who become engaged within a group, cause or ideology go on to develop an intention to cause harm, so this dimension is considered separately. Intent factors describe the mindset associated with a readiness to use violence, and address what the individual would do and to what end. They can include:

- Overidentification with a group or ideology
- ‘Them and Us’ thinking
- Dehumanisation of the enemy
• Attitudes that justify offending
• Harmful means to an end
• Harmful objectives

Example indicators that an individual has an intention to use violence or other illegal means include:

• Clearly identifying another group and what they stand for as threatening or harmful to the group the individual is belonging to, and blaming that group for all social or political ills
• Using insulting or derogatory names or labels for another group
• Speaking about the imminence of harm from the other group and the importance of action now
• Expressing attitudes which justify offending on behalf of the group, cause or ideology
• Condoning or supporting violence or harm towards others or
• Plotting or conspiring with others.

**Capability to Cause Harm**

Not all those who have a wish to cause harm on behalf of a group, cause or ideology are capable of doing so, and plots to cause widespread damage take a high level of personal capability, resources and networking to be successful. What an individual is capable of is therefore a key consideration when assessing risk of harm to the public. Factors can include:

• Individual knowledge, skills and competencies
• Access to networks, funding or equipment
Example indicators which show that an individual is capable of contributing directly or indirectly to an act of violent extremism:

- Having a history of violence
- Being criminally versatile and using criminal networks to support extremist goals
- Having occupational skills that can enable acts of violence or
- Having technical expertise that can be deployed.

**Multi-agency Approach to Implementation of Vulnerability Assessment Framework**

Based on the experiences and approaches applied in the UK, it should be established a multisectoral approach to protecting youth at risk of extremism and radicalism. In each of the target institutions, responsible persons should be delegated to be part of a multi-agency body, which can comprehensively and collectively assess the risks.

This main responsibilities of this body should be:

- to identify individuals and groups at risk of being drawn towards violent extremism
- to assess the nature and the extent of risk
- to develop appropriate support plans for at-risk youth.

This body would thereby be responsible for prevention of extremism and radicalism and early intervention aimed at protection.
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